



18 MAR 1975

U-48,911/DS-6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, SECURITY COMMITTEE, USIB

SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/7, "Control of Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence"

References: a. Item number three on the Agenda for the SECOM meeting, 18 March 1975.

b. Draft (4) DCID 1/7, 3 March 1975.

1. This memorandum provides background information concerning the DIA recommendation for deletion of the control markings in subparagraphs 5.(1), 5.(2) and 5.(3) of reference b. Specifically these markings are:

a. EXTRACTION OR PARAPHRASING OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT PROHIBITED (NO EXTRACT).

b. DISSEM WITHIN USA ONLY.

c. NOT RELEASABLE TO CONSULTANTS OR CONTRACTORS (NO CONTRACTOR).

2. As you are aware, the mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency is to provide finished, evaluated intelligence to DoD consumers. The above markings would make it difficult, or in some cases, impossible to provide complete and timely intelligence support to our consumers. They do not appear to significantly improve security of the information and, in one case, would appear to detract from its security. Specific objections to each marking are:

a. NO EXTRACT: This marking impairs our ability to use such information in the conduct of our primary function, the production of intelligence. Such information becomes intelligence only after it is analyzed and collated with other available information. Obtaining permission to use a number of such documents in an intelligence product and markings restricting its subsequent use by recipients would create an administrative nightmare. It will also hamper the use of such information on a time-sensitive basis, such as in the DIA Daily Intelligence Notices (DIMS). Even if permission to use the information in such a format was given, it would prohibit recipients from using it to prepare integrated intelligence assessments, thus causing commanders to conduct their own evaluations of

DIA review(s) completed.


its relation to other intelligence. Another serious problem with this marking is failure to recognize the "need to know" principle. A document so marked must be given in entirety or not at all. Some recipients may urgently require some of the information, but not need or want other portions of the document concerned.

b. **DISSEM WITHIN USA ONLY:** This marking takes no cognizance of the "need to know" principle. Proper dissemination is a vital element in the intelligence cycle. It could adversely affect DoD U&S Commanders located overseas who may have an absolute need to know for certain information but would be denied it or delayed in receiving it due to this caveat. This marking would also appear to deny the right to send such information to any naval vessel outside U.S. coastal waters. Senior commanders overseas must be given full intelligence support, particularly concerning threat information and only DoD is qualified to determine what they need to know.

c. **NO CONTRACTOR:** This marking has several serious defects. Denial of access to reservists is counter to DoD policy on the use of reservists. The application of this caveat to non-contractor consultants also poses significant problems. All high level policy makers rely heavily on consultants. It is noted that the DCI employed a consultant to prepare his position on the FY 63 - 73 Secretary of Defense Posture Statements in December 1974. Concurrently such DoD consultants, hired under Civil Service Commission Regulations, are considered the equivalent of federal employees. To consider them as contractor personnel would mean restricting access of individuals performing tasks for heads of Departments and their highest level assistants. Further, the predecessor of this marking, "CONTROLLED DISSEM," has caused considerable administrative problems. At least one of the Military Departments has complained about delays in its contractor support program because of the marking. The new caveat would be even more restrictive.

3. The markings above interfere with the ability to produce intelligence and disseminate the product to individuals who have a valid need for it. A document which is classified, and which bears an exemption category and a "WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" caveat informs all recipients that the document requires special care in handling and dissemination. DoD senior intelligence officials can and will give it the protection it deserves. It cannot be assumed that several additional markings would make recipients more careful than they already are. Reports of such a sensitivity to require

additional markings should be placed in the "EYES ONLY" or other specified limited distribution categories. The markings discussed above do not beneficially restrict dissemination since they would permit unlimited dissemination within the U.S. to permanent Government employees and military personnel.



RICHARD L. CARY

DIA Member

Security Committee, USIB